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 1 
1. Introduction 
  Externalities have engaged the attention of economists over a long period of time.  Broadly 
speaking, they can be categorized as (i) consumption externalities, and (ii) production externalities.
1  
Recently, the former have been extensively studied in the context of models of “keeping up with the 
Joneses,” and their implications for a range of important issues investigated.  For example, Abel 
(1990), Gali (1994), and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) study the effects of consumption 
externalities on asset pricing and the equity premium.  Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) analyze the 
impact of consumption externalities on the effect of short-run macroeconomic stabilization policy.  
Dupor and Liu (2003) define alternative forms of consumption externalities and explore their 
implications for equilibrium over-consumption, while Fisher and Hof (2000, 2001) and Liu and 
Turnovsky (2003) consider their impact on the process of capital accumulation and growth. 
Production externalities provide the cornerstone for the endogenous growth model pioneered 
by Romer (1986).  The key feature of this literature is that even though the individual firm’s capital 
stock may be subject to diminishing marginal physical product, the presence of an aggregate 
production externality enhances its productivity so that in equilibrium the economy is able to sustain 
a steady growth rate.   
  Empirical evidence on the importance of externalities is sparse, but overall, the existing 
evidence provides convincing support for the importance of consumption externalities.  Easterlin 
(1995) discusses a number of studies relating happiness to income growth.  Using US, European, and 
Japanese time series data, he concludes that raising income of all does not increase everyone’s 
happiness, implying the presence of negative externalities.  Clark and Oswald (1996) present some 
direct empirical evidence for British workers, showing that their reported satisfaction levels are 
inversely related to their comparison wage rates.  Frank (1997) provides a comprehensive discussion 
based on both psychological evidence and the more fragmentary evidence in behavioral economics.  
He concludes that both these sources support the claim that satisfaction depends upon the agent’s 
                                                 
1 Consumption externalities were emphasized in early work by Veblen (1912) and were first formalized as a determinant 
of aggregate consumption by Duesenberry (1949) in his development of the “relative income hypothesis”. The earliest 
discussion of production externalities dates back to Marshall (1890).  2 
relative position, again emphasizing the role of the environment and the externalities it generates. 
  The evidence on production externalities, though less conclusive, is still quite compelling.  
Caballero and Lyons (1990, 1992) analyze externalities within the context of EU and US 
manufacturing industries.  Although they find evidence of externalities, their analysis has been 
questioned by Basu and Fernald (1996) and Burnside (1995).  On the other hand, using a 
methodology similar to that employed by Basu and Fernald, Benarroch (1997) finds evidence of 
externalities at the two-digit industry level in Canada. 
  A related and equally important issue concerns the specification of preferences themselves.  
The conventional intertemporal utility function is assumed to be time-separable, with any 
consumption externality being introduced as contemporaneous economy-wide consumption; see e.g. 
Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Gali (1994), Harbaugh (1995), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Dupor 
and Liu (2003), Fisher and Hof (2000, 2001), Liu and Turnovsky (2003).  But a growing body of 
empirical evidence has confirmed the importance of time non-separable preferences, in which utility 
depends not only upon current consumption, but also on some benchmark or “habit” level of 
consumption determined from past behavior.  In the case that this benchmark is defined in terms of 
the consumption of an external reference group it introduces a consumption externality (utility 
interdependence), but one that is tied to past consumptions.  This type of externality is often termed 
as “catching up with” rather than “keeping up with” with the Joneses.
2 
Using panel data for the Netherlands, van de Stadt, Kapteyn, and van de Geer (1985) model 
both habit formation and utility interdependence.  Their results are compatible with the hypothesis 
that utility depends upon relative consumption, although they cannot exclude the possibility that 
utility reflects both relative and absolute consumption.  Using UK data, Osborn (1988) introduces a 
consumption specification that allows for seasonal variations and habit persistence, and finds the 
habit persistent terms to be jointly significant.  More recently Fuhrer (2000) uses maximum 
likelihood to estimate an approximate linear consumption function derived from time non-separable 
                                                 
2Utility functions in which the benchmark depends upon the agent’s own past consumptions the evolving benchmark is 
not acting as an externality, and such agents are sometimes referred to as being “inward looking”, whereas if the 
benchmark depends upon the consumption of an outside reference group, the agent is referred to as “outward looking” 
see e.g. Carroll, Overland, and Weil (1997, 2000).  Since for plausible parameterization of the model both inward and 
outward looking models behave similarly [see Carroll. et al. (1997) and Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004)], we shall focus 
on the outward-looking case. 3 
preferences, strongly rejecting the hypothesis of time separable preferences.  In addition, Fuhrer and 
Klein (1998) present empirical evidence suggesting that habit formation is relevant for the 
characterization of consumption behavior among the G-7 countries.  More indirect evidence is 
provided by studies of Constantinides (1990) and others who have shown how habit formation can 
provide a solution to the equity premium puzzle. 
  In light of these bodies of evidence, the question of how consumption and production 
externalities affect economic performance under time non-separable preferences is important.  To 
what extent do they introduce distortions into the process of capital accumulation, and if so, what are 
the appropriate corrective policy responses?  Liu and Turnovsky (2003) have addressed this issue 
employing a standard time-separable utility function, emphasizing particularly the interaction 
between the two types of externalities.  But given the evidence suggesting that preferences are 
characterized by a high degree of complementarity between consumption over time, it is important 
to extend the analysis to incorporate these more general preferences.
3   
To do so is the objective of the present paper.  More specifically, we introduce time non-
separable preferences, as originally specified by Abel (1990) in the context of asset pricing, into the 
“non-scale growth model” developed by Eicher and Turnovsky (1999a, 199b).  The interaction 
between preferences and technology is important.  Previous applications of these preferences by 
Carroll, Overland, and Weil (1997, 2000), Fisher and Hof (2000), Alonso-Carrera, Caballe, and 
Raurich (2001a), have typically assumed rigid production conditions of the simplest endogenous 
growth model.
4  Recently, Alvarez-Cuadrado, Monteiro, and Turnovsky (2004) have highlighted the 
importance of combining more general preferences with the more flexible production technology of 
the neoclassical model, in replicating observed behavior.   
We consider both consumption and production externalities, comparing their impacts on 
economic performance, and deriving the appropriate fiscal policy responses.  In this respect our 
analysis is related to Alonso-Carrera et al. (2001b) who consider labor supply to be inelastic.  Our 
                                                 
3 There is a growing literature, characterized as capturing “the spirit of capitalism” that expresses consumption 
externalities in terms of relative wealth effects, see e.g. Kurz (1978) and more recently Zou (1995). 
4There are exceptions, however.  Early pioneering work by Ryder and Heal (1973) introduced habit formation into the 
basic neoclassical growth model  Alonso-Carrera et al. (2001b) employ the hybrid neoclassical-AK production function 
introduced by Jones and Manuelli (1990). 4 
analysis allows for the endogeneity of labor supply, which previous research has been shown to be 
an important determinant of optimal tax policy in a growing economy; see e.g. Turnovsky (2000b), 
Liu and Turnovsky (2003).
5 
The paper proceeds in two main stages.  The first part develops the general theoretical model.  
Our results take the form of a series of propositions summarizing how the externalities impinge on 
the macroeconomic equilibrium and proposing fiscal policies to correct for the distortions they may 
create.  The latter part conducts numerical simulations of both the steady-state equilibrium and the 
transitional dynamics in response to a specific shock, taken to be an increase in productivity.   
One general conclusion is that consumption externalities in isolation will have long-run 
distortionary effects on the economy if and only if labor supply is endogenous.  This is because such 
externalities affect the marginal valuation of consumption, which, if the leisure decision is 
endogenous, changes the optimal utility value of the marginal product of labor, thereby influencing 
long-run capital and output.  Thus, with elastic labor supply, a negative consumption externality 
leads to long-run consumption, capital, labor supply, and output that are all too high relative to their 
respective optima.  If labor supply is fixed, then consumption externalities alone have no long-run 
distortionary effects.  They do, however, distort effects the transitional dynamic path, and they will 
generate long-run distortions through their interaction with production externalities.   
Production externalities alone always generate long-run distortions, irrespective of whether 
labor supply is fixed or not.  Thus a positive production externality leads to a sub-optimally low 
capital stock with under-production and under-consumption.  In addition, a consumption externality 
will affect the potency of the production externality on long-run activity through its impact on the 
labor-leisure choice and thus on the marginal product of capital. 
We characterize an optimal tax policy to correct for the distortionary effects.  It requires 
capital income to be taxed or subsidized at a constant rate that corrects for the production externality, 
while consumption should be taxed or subsidized at a time-varying rate that corrects for the 
divergence between the social and private benefits from the consumption externality as reflected in 
                                                 
5 Our model differs in several other respects from Alonso-Carrera et al. (2001b).  One important difference is that they 
assume that the reference consumption level in utility is determined by the previous period’s consumption, and thus 
adjusts rapidly.  We allow for a much more gradual adjustment, which turns out to be important in reconciling the 
implications of this model with certain observed empirical phenomena; see Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004)  5 
the evolving relative shadow value of habits to capital.  The tax on labor income can be set at an 
arbitrary constant level, allowing the policy maker to accommodate some other objective.  This 
means that labor income can be untaxed, or alternatively can be taxed at the same rate as capital, 
thus taxing all income at a constant uniform rate,  
The simulations confirm and supplement these theoretical findings in several dimensions.  
First, the numerical impacts of the two externalities on steady-state equilibrium are assessed.  We 
find that both consumption and production externalities of plausible magnitudes generate substantial 
long-run deviations of the decentralized economy from the optimum.  Whereas, the consumption 
externality affects key measures of economic activity proportionately, the production externality has 
substantial differential effects.  There are also pronounced asymmetries in the effects of positive and 
negative externalities of comparable magnitudes.  Finally, our results illustrate the role of the labor 
supply elasticity on the impacts of the externalities on equilibrium. 
Second, the long-run and short-run effects of a 50% increase in productivity are considered.  
Because of the non-scale technology, this shock affects the long-run measures of economic activity 
in both the decentralized and centrally planned economies by identical proportionate amounts.  The 
differences in proportionate welfare gains between the two economies reflect differences along the 
transitional paths and are therefore small.  However, the actual magnitudes of the welfare differences 
can be substantial.  We also trace out the ratios of key variables in the decentralized to the centrally 
planned economy to determine the time paths of the various distortionary effects.  In most cases 
there is little change over time, though there are important exceptions.  The time path is sensitive to 
the weight assigned to past consumption in the construction of the benchmark consumption level.  
We provide a plausible example showing how as this increases, capital may go through phases of 
over-accumulation, under-accumulation, and then over-accumulation during the transition.  Finally, 
we provide numerical estimates of the optimal tax rates necessary to track the optimal equilibrium.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 sets out the preferences and technology, 
together with the assumptions on the consumption and production externalities.  Sections 3 and 4 
characterize the macrodynamic equilibria in the decentralized and centrally planned (optimal) 
economies respectively, while Section 5 compares their steady states.  First-best optimal tax policy is 6 
characterized in Section 6.  The numerical analysis of the transitional paths is discussed in Sections 7 
and 8.  Section 9 provides concluding comments and technical details are relegated to the Appendix. 
2.  Preferences and Technology: Consumption and Production Externalities 
  Consider an economy populated by N infinitely-lived identical households, where N grows at 
the constant exponential rate, n.  The agent is endowed with a unit of time, part of which,  i L  can be 
supplied as labor input and the remainder,  1 ii lL ≡ − , consumed as leisure.  We assume that at any 
instant of time households derive utility not only from their current consumption,  i C , but also from 
leisure, as well as the current level of a reference consumption stock,  i H , (habit) based on economy-
wide consumption, that the agent takes as given.  Thus the agent’s utility is represented by an iso-
elastic function of the type employed by Abel (1990), Carroll, Overland, and Weil (1997, 2000), 
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From the right hand side of (1), we see that agents derive utility from a geometric weighted 
average of absolute and relative consumption, these corresponding to  0 γ = , and  1 γ = , respectively.  
The form of the utility specification (1) raises questions about whether or not the necessary first-
order conditions that we derive are in fact optimal.  This problem is characteristic of all the literature 
that employs the utility function in (1).   In the case of the representative agent, 
i H  is an externality 
and the restrictions imposed on  , θ ε  ensure that the utility function is jointly concave in the private 
variables , ii Cl .  Given that the constraints are concave functions, the first order conditions suffice to 
ensure a maximum.  By contrast, for the central planner who chooses 
i H  together with  i C , the 
utility function is not jointly concave in both these variables, unless  0 γ < , and thus the first-order 
conditions may not yield a maximum.  In this case the paper by Alonso-Carrera et al. (2001b) argues 
that the interior solution will ensure utility maximization if one restricts  1 ε > , consistent with the 
empirical evidence, and a restriction that we shall impose.   
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Thus (2) implies that the agent’s reference stock is an exponentially declining weighted average of 
the economy-wide average consumption 
1
N
i i CC N
= ≡∑ .  Differentiating (2) with respect to time 
implies the following rate of adjustment for the reference stock 
() ii HC H ρ =−          ( 3 )  
The speed of adjustment, ρ, parameterizes the relative importance of recent consumption in 
determining the reference stock; higher values of ρ  imply a higher influence of current consumption 
in the determination of the future reference stock.  In particular, as ρ →∞,  i HC → , 
contemporaneous economy-wide average consumption, as in Gali (1994), Fisher and Hof (2000), 
Dupor and Liu (2003) and Liu and Turnovsky (2003), which obtains as a limiting case. 
 With  i H  determined by (2) [or (3)] it is clear that economy-wide consumption imposes an 
externality on the agent.  Most of the literature focuses on the case  0 γ ≥ , implying that agents 
derive disutility from a ceteris paribus increase in the consumption reference stock.  This 
corresponds to the idea of “catching up to the Joneses”, as formulated by Carroll et al (1997, 2000), 
Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) and Alvarez et al (2004).  But we shall also entertain the possibility that 
0 γ < , so that the agent’s utility increases with a ceteris paribus increase in the reference 
consumption level.  This describes the notion of altruism.  The representative agent feels better off if 
members of the community around him are successful; see Dupor and Liu (2003).
6 
  The specification of utility in terms of (1) and (2) implies that the time non-separability of 
utility is due entirely to the consumption externality.  It is possible for the time non-separability to be 
internally generated, or to be due to some hybrid, as formulated by Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004).   
Analogous to Liu and Turnovsky we shall impose the following restrictions on the size of the 
consumption externality, to ensure in effect that it is dominated by the direct effect: 
    1 γ <          ( 4 a )  
                                                 
6 They distinguish between the notion of “jealousy” that depends upon the first derivative of the externality on utility and 
“keeping up with the Joneses” which they formulate in terms of appropriate cross derivatives. 8 
    (1 ) 0 ε γγ −+ >       ( 4 b )  
The first of these conditions is the non-satiation condition initially imposed by Ryder and Heal 
(1973), which asserts that a uniformly sustained increase in consumption level increases utility.  The 
second condition restricts the externality so as to ensure that a uniformly sustained increase in 
consumption level across agents has diminishing marginal utility.
7 
  The household has a production technology that is homogeneous of degree one in its private 
inputs, capital  i K  and labor  i L , with both factors having positive but diminishing marginal physical 
product.  In addition, output depends on the aggregate stock of capital, denoted by  i i KK =∑ .  
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, individual output is determined by
8 
    
1 ;         0 1 ii i YL K K
σσ η ασ
− =< <      (5) 
The externality generated by aggregate capital, η , may be positive, zero, or negative.  In 
Romer’s seminal work (1986) the aggregate capital stock serves as a proxy for the level of 
knowledge and thus generates a positive production externality.  However,  0 η <  may reflect 
adverse congestion effects of aggregate capital on the productivity of private capital; see e.g. Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Eicher and Turnovsky (2000). 
Analogous to the restrictions on the consumption externality, the following restrictions on the 
production externality are assumed 
    ( 1 ) σ ησ >> −−        ( 6 )  
The right hand inequality ensures that the externality, if negative, is sufficiently small so that the 
social marginal product of capital remains positive [see (18c) below].  The left hand inequality 
imposes an upper limit on any positive externality generated by aggregate capital, in order for a 
                                                 
7 Expressed in terms of general utility functions  these two conditions require:  (,, ) (,, )0 ; C i ii H i ii U CCl U CCl +>  
 (,, ) (,, )0 CC i i i CH i i i U CCl U CCl +<  
8 Our choice of the Cobb-Douglas production function is imposed by the fact we wish to introduce production 
externalities leading to non-constant returns to scale.  The Cobb-Douglas production function is the only technology 
consistent with a balanced growth path under non-constant returns to scale; see Eicher and Turnovsky (1999b). 9 
uniformly sustained increase in capital stock to have diminishing marginal product.
 9  
3.  Macrodynamic Equilibrium: Decentralized Economy 
  The individual in the decentralized economy chooses consumption, labor supply, and rate of 
capital accumulation to maximize the utility function (1) subject to the capital accumulation equation 
    ( ) ii i i Kr n K w L C δ =− − + −         ( 7 )  
where r denotes the gross return to capital, w denotes the wage rate, and δ  denotes the constant rate 
of depreciation of capital.  In doing so, the agent behaves atomistically, taking the aggregate 
quantities C  and K, as well as the evolution of the reference consumption stock, (3), as given. 








































        ( 8 c )  
where  i λ  denotes the private shadow value to agent i of an additional unit of capital, together with 
the transversality condition   
lim
t→∞λiKie
−βt = 0        ( 8 d )  
The interpretations of these equations are standard; (8a) equates the marginal utility of consumption 
to the private shadow value of capital taking into account the fact that utility depends upon current 
consumption relative to the external benchmark; (8b) equates the marginal utility of leisure to the 
private opportunity cost, the real wage valued at the shadow value of capital, while (8c) equates the 
marginal return to capital to the rate of return on consumption, given by the right hand side.   
                                                 
9Turnovsky (2000a) derives η σ <  as a necessary and sufficient for stability in the basic one-sector non-scale growth 
model with conventional utility.  It also turns out to be a necessary condition for stability for the present model. 10 
With all individuals being identical, aggregating (5) over the N agents, yields the aggregate 
production function  i i YY ≡∑ , 
()
1 (1 ) Yl N K
σ σ η α
− + =−        ( 9 )  
Total returns to scale, 1+η, are decreasing, constant, or increasing, according to whether the 
spillover from aggregate capital is negative, zero, or positive.  The equilibrium gross real return to 
capital, r, and the real wage, w, are thus respectively: 
  (1 ) (1 ) ;  
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Substituting (10) into (7), the individual’s rate of capital accumulation can be expressed as  
1 () ii i i i KL K K C nK
σσ η αδ
− =− − +        (7’) 
We define a balanced growth path as being one along which all variables grow at a constant 
rate.  With capital being accumulated from final output, the only balanced solution is one in which 
the capital-output ratio, K /Y, remains constant.  Taking percentage changes of the aggregate 
production function, the long-run equilibrium growth rate of output and capital along the balanced 
growth path,  ˆ Y  and ˆ K , is  





                  (11) 
Because of the non-scale nature of the production function, the equilibrium growth rate is 
determined solely by technological factors, together with the population growth rate, and is 
independent of all demand characteristics, including the consumption externality; see Jones (1995).  
There is long-run per capita growth if and only if  0 η > . 
Following our definition of the balanced growth path, it is convenient to write the system in 
terms of the following stationary variables  ,, ,
g gg g kK NyY NhH NcC N ≡≡ ≡≡ , (where C, H, 
also denote aggregate quantities) which we characterize as being “scale-adjusted” per capita 
quantities, and which under constant returns to scale ( 1) g =  reduce to standard per capita quantities. 11 
Using this notation, the scale adjusted aggregate output (9) can be written as: 
()
1 1 yl k
σ σ η α
− + =−         ( 1 2 )  
We will focus on equilibrium paths along which all households are identical, so that 
,  ii CC C KK == =.  We shall refer to such paths as “symmetric equilibria”.   
In the Appendix we show how the equilibrium dynamics of the decentralized economy can 
be expressed by the following system in terms of the redefined stationary variables,  , , , lkhc , where 
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together with the production function (12).
 10 
Equation (13d) is obtained by dividing the optimality conditions (8a) and (8b). It reflects the 
condition that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure() Cl θ , which 
grows with per capita consumption, must equal the wage rate( ) (1 ) Yl σ − , which grows with per 
capita income. Notice that the equilibrium consumption-output ratio increases with leisure, this 
                                                 
10 Solving (13d) and (12b) yields 
** * ** * * * (,) ,  (,) cc k lyy k l == .  Then substituting these solutions into (13a) – (13c) 
yields an autonomous dynamic system in 
** * ,, khl  .  The numerical analysis conducted in Sections 7 and 8 is based on 
the linearized approximation to this system. 12 
result following from the complementarity between leisure and consumption in utility. 
  Imposing the steady state condition, 
*** 0 lkh = ==  , we can solve (13) for the steady-state 
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These five equations determine the steady-state equilibrium as follows.  First (14c) yields the steady-
state output-capital ratio, so that the long-run net private return to capital equals the rate of return on 
consumption, while (14b) determines the equilibrium ratio of consumption to its reference stock. 
Having determined the output-capital ratio, (14a) determines the consumption-output ratio consistent 
with generating the growth rate of capital necessary to equip the growing labor force and replace the 
depreciating capital stock.  Given the steady-state consumption to output ratio, (14e) determines the 
allocation of time to leisure, 
* l .  Given the steady-state values for 
** *  and  ly k   , the production 
function, (14d), then implies the corresponding value of capital, 
* k   and hence output, 
* y  . 
The key parameters include  , γ ρ , which reflect the consumption externality, and η , which 
specifies the production externality.  From (14) we observe the following asymmetry between the 
two externalities.  The consumption externality influences steady-state equilibrium in the 
decentralized economy if and only if there is a production externality (i.e.  0 η ≠ ).  In contrast, the 
production externality impacts the equilibrium independent of any consumption externality. 
If  0 (i.e.  1) g η == , the parameters  , γ ρ , pertaining to the consumption externality become 
irrelevant.  In that case (14b) implies 
** ch =   , so that the stationary current and reference 13 
consumption levels coincide.  Equation (14c) reduces to the standard modified golden rule condition, 
consistent with the early result of Ryder and Heal (1973) and the overall steady-state equilibrium 
reduces to that of conventional time-separable utility.  If  0 η ≠ , then ρ  affects only the 
consumption-habits ratio, while γ  has more pervasive effects.  If  0 η > , and assuming  1 ε > , a 
larger weight to the consumption habit, γ , reduces the long-run rate of return on consumption [the 
right hand side of (14c)], and thus the output-capital ratio.  For goods market equilibrium to prevail, 
the consumption-output ratio must then decline, inducing more leisure.   
In Section 8 below, we shall illustrate the dynamic response of the economy by introducing 
an increase in productivity, α .  From (14), we see that the long-run responses are 
    
***
** *








       ( 1 5 a )  
   () ( )
** ** *
** ** * 0
dyk dc y dl
cy yk l
== =
   
  
      (15b) 
The capital stock, output, and consumption change proportionately, with leisure (labor) remaining 
unchanged.  That these results are independent of the consumption externality, but depend upon the 
production, is a manifestation of the non-scale production technology. 
4.  Macrodynamic Equilibrium: Centrally Planned Economy 
In deriving his optimum, the individual agent neglects the externalities present in both 
consumption and production.  As a consequence, the macroeconomic equilibrium generated by the 
decentralized economy may diverge from the social optimum.  To derive the optimal resource 
allocation of the economy, we consider a social planner who chooses quantities directly to maximize 
the intertemporal utility of the representative agent, (1), while taking both externalities into account. 
Specifically, the central planner internalizes the aggregation relationship  i KN K = , thus 
perceiving the individual’s resource constraint (7’) as 
 
1 () ii i i i KL KN C nK
σσ η η αδ
−+ =− − +        ( 7 ” )  14 
In addition, he perceives that the consumption reference stock depends upon the economy-wide 
average of consumption, which is just equal to the consumption of the representative agent, and thus 
fully internalizes the impact of the agent’s current decisions on the future evolution of the reference 
stock, in accordance with 
    () ii i HC H ρ =−          ( 3 ’ )  
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where,  1i λ ,  2i λ , denote the social shadow values associated with the capital stock,  i K , and the 





−βtλ2iHi = 0      ( 1 6 e )  
There are several key differences from the corresponding conditions for the decentralized 
economy.  First, (16a) equates the utility of an additional unit of consumption, adjusted by its impact 
on the future reference stock, to the social shadow value of capital.  Second, (16c) equates the social 
rate of return to capital to the social rate of return on consumption.  Third, (16d) is an intertemporal 
allocation condition equating at the margin, the rate of return on habits – which consists of its direct 
utility benefits less costs through its impact on future accumulation – to the rate of return on 
consumption, both evaluated in terms of the shadow value of habits. 
Thus the optimization problem confronting the central planner requires the monitoring of two 15 
state variables.  Letting  21 ii i q λ λ ≡  denote the relative price of consumption habit to physical 
capital, after summing across households we can express the macrodynamic equilibrium of the 
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o denotes the “optimum” or equilibrium in the centrally planned economy, F is defined as in (13e), 
and the production function is given by (12). 
Imposing the stationary conditions,  0
oooo lhqk = ===    , together with the production 
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11 The derivations actually involve some details that are spelled out in the Appendix. 16 
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The parallels between these six equations and (14a) – (14e) for the decentralized economy 
are clear, and indeed, equations (18a), (18b), and (18d) remain unchanged.  An interesting difference 
arises with regard to (18c), where the left hand side includes the effect of the productive externality 
and thus measures the social rate of return to capital, while the right hand side is the same as that of 
(14c) and equals the private rate of return on consumption.  In other words, the steady-state social 
and private rates of return on consumption coincide.  The role of the consumption externality is 
reflected in (18e).  In contrast to the representative agent who evaluates the consumption-leisure 
choice in terms of the private marginal rate of substitution, (14e), the central planner also takes into 
account the social marginal value of the reference consumption stock through the term 1( 1 )
o q ρ −  .  
Equation (18f) implies that unless there is an implausibly large negative production externality, 
0
o q <   if and only if the consumption externality is negative ( 0 γ > ).  In that case, an increase in the 
level of the reference stock, given current consumption, is welfare-reducing, so that its shadow value 
is negative.  The opposite argument applies in the case of altruism.   
One important difference in (18) from (14) is that in the centrally planned economy the 
consumption externality  , γ ρ  has effects even in the absence of a production externality.  This 
occurs through the social marginal rate of substitution, (18e).  Setting  0 η = ,  ,
oo oo ykcy     remain 
independent of the consumption externality.  But an increase in γ  makes the shadow value of the 
reference stock 
o q   more negative, reducing the relative valuation, 1( 1 )
o q ρ −  .  Given 
oo cy  , this 
raises leisure (reduces labor supply).  Given 
oo yk   , the reduction in labor supply reduces capital, 
output, and consumption.  The same applies asρ  increases.  One further point is that the long-run 
responses in the centrally planned economy to an increase in productivity remain given by (15). 17 
As we will show, the significance of consumption externalities depends crucially upon 
whether labor supply is elastic or fixed.  In the latter case, the optimality conditions for the 
labor/leisure decision [(14e) and (18e)] drop out, while the remaining equations are unchanged, with 
*,
o ll set at their inelastically fixed levels.  In that case, as in the decentralized economy, the 
consumption elasticity will impact the equilibrium if and only if there is a production externality.  
Our objective is to determine how closely the decentralized economy tracks the time path of 
the optimal centrally planned economy and to propose tax policies to correct for the distortions that 
may arise.  Because of the complexity of the model we need to conduct the analysis of the dynamics 
numerically, but to aid in our understanding of these numerical simulations it is useful to examine 
first the steady states. 
5.  Comparison of Steady-State Equilibria 
We begin with the simple, but important, case where labor is supplied inelastically.   
5.1  Inelastic labor supply 
In the decentralized economy the steady-state equilibrium values of 
**** ,,, kchy    are 
determined by (14a) – (14d), while in the centrally planned economy, the corresponding steady-state 
values, , , ,
oooo kchy   , are determined by (18a) – (18d).  With labor supplied inelastically at a 
common level, l , in the two economies, it is immediately seen that in the absence of a production 
externality 0 η = , these two sets of equations coincide, so that the steady-state equilibria in the two 
economies exactly coincide.  Consumption externalities, γ , alone then have no effect on the steady 
state in either economy.   
In the absence of a consumption externality,  0 γ = , the crucial difference is in the presence 
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which together with the production functions (14d), (18d) implies 18 
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Combining (19a) with (14a) and (18a) implies 
** oo cy cy >    and if in addition, we assume that the 
economy is dynamically efficient, we further obtain
* o cc <  .
12  We may summarize these results in 
Proposition 1:  In a decentralized economy with inelastic labor supply and a positive 
production externality, the steady-state equilibrium capital stock and output are 
below their respective optimal levels, while the equilibrium output-capital ratio is too 
high.  The consumption-output ratio is also too high, although if the economy is 
dynamically efficient, the consumption level is too low.  These comparisons are 
reversed if the production externality is negative.  In the absence of any production 
externality, a consumption externality causes no long-run distortionary effects.  
 Although,  consumption  externalities alone play no role in determining the steady state, they 
do interact with production externalities in a growing economy.  This can be seen from (14c), (18c), 
together with (19b).  If  0, 0 n η >> , an increase in γ  will raise 
*,
o yy   proportionately.  It will also 
raise 
*,
o kk   by a larger proportionate amount, thus reducing the output-capital ratios in the two 
economies proportionately.  The distortions in output and capital increase in absolute size.   
5.2 Elastic  labor  supply 
  With endogenous labor supply, the consumption externality will now affect the steady state 
even in the absence of any production externality.  This is because it affects the marginal valuation 
of consumption, which in turn changes the optimal utility value of the marginal product of labor.  
Thus, consumption distortion results in labor distortion and therefore creates production inefficiency. 
  The comparison now involves the complete sets of equations (14) and (18) and leads to the 
following.  Consider first the absence of a production externality.  In this case comparing (14c) and 
(18c), (14b) and (18b), (14a) and (18a) implies 
                                                 
12This can be formally demonstrated by expanding the decentralized equilibrium around the optimum, as in Liu and 
Turnovsky (2003). 19 
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If the consumption externality is negative, ( 0 γ > ) then  0
o q <   and equating (14e) to (18e) implies 
* o ll <   or equivalently, 




=>   , 
and hence 
* o yy >  , and thus from (20) we obtain 
* o cc >  .  The reverse applies if  0 γ < .
13  In the case 
of a positive production externality but no consumption externality,(0 ,0 ) η γ >= , the comparison 
made above in the case of inelastic labor supply continues to apply.  In addition the fact that 
** oo cy cy >    implies 
* o ll >  , or equivalently 
* o LL <  , with the reverse applying if  0 η < . 
These results may be summarized by the following proposition relating the actual and 
socially optimal equilibria in the presence of consumption and production externalities.   
Proposition 2:  In an economy with endogenous labor supply, the steady-state 
equilibrium has the following properties. 
1.  In the case of a negative consumption externality ( 0 γ > ), equilibrium 
consumption, capital stock, and labor supply are all greater than their respective 
long-run optimal values, (
* ,
o cc >   
* ,
o kk > ** ,
oo LL y y >>   ).  In the case of altruism 
these relationships are reversed. 
2.  If the production technology exhibits a positive aggregate capital 
externality (0 ) η > , equilibrium consumption, capital stock, and labor supply are all 
below their respective long-run optimal values, (
* ,
o cc <   
* ,
o kk < * o LL <  ,
* o yy <   ).  
In the case of a negative externality these relationships are reversed. 
To understand these results, we first consider the effect of a consumption externality. The 
first order condition in the household’s maximization problem requires the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption and leisure to equal the marginal product of labor. In the case of 
jealousy, equilibrium consumption is over-valued.  This results in the equilibrium consumption 
being too high compared to the social optimum and leisure being too low, (or equivalently, labor 
                                                 
13 As  ρ  increases, the magnitudes of these deviations from their respective optimum increase.  It thus follows that the 
deviations under time non-separable preferences are smaller in magnitude than those obtained when the consumption 
externality is contemporaneous. 20 
supply being too high).  Because capital and labor are complements, and because in steady state the 
marginal product of capital is fixed, a higher equilibrium labor input implies a higher equilibrium 
capital stock.  The argument is reversed if preferences exhibit altruism.
14   
In the case of a positive production externality the marginal product of capital is undervalued 
by the private agent.  Since the marginal product of capital is diminishing, and the steady state 
requires the marginal product of capital to be identical in the two economies, less capital is needed in 
the decentralized economy compared to the socially optimal economy to achieve the equilibrium 
condition on the marginal product of capital.  Thus less output will be produced and equilibrium 
consumption reduced correspondingly.  The higher output-capital ratio in the decentralized economy 
implies a higher consumption-output ratio.  The positive relationship between the latter and leisure 
in utility leads to a higher proportion of time devoted to leisure, i.e. a reduction in labor supply.   
6.  Optimal Tax Policy  
The fact that consumption and production externalities create distortions in resource 
allocation provides an opportunity for government tax policies to improve efficiency.  Consider 
again the decentralized economy populated by identical agents.  Let τk be the tax rate on the return 
to private capital, τw the tax rate on labor income, τc the tax rate on consumption, and  i T  lump-sum 
transfers (taxes).  The representative agent maximizes the utility function (1), subject to the budget 
constraint, now modified to: 
[ ] (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ik i w i c i i Kr n K w L C T τδ τ τ =− − − + − − + +        (21) 
The government maintains a balanced budget, rebating all tax revenues as lump sum transfers: 
     
i
ki w c i i rK wL C T τττ ++ =       ( 2 2 )  
The first order optimality conditions of the decentralized economy now become: 
                                                 
14Frank (1999) describes the over-consumption phenomenon and argues that people tend to work too long, due to 
negative consumption externalities, consistent with the result of Proposition 2.  However, contrary to what he argues, 
Proposition 2 shows that negative consumption externalities do not imply under-saving.  In fact, with negative 
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together with the transversality condition (8d).   
The objective is to characterize a tax structure such that the decentralized economy mimics 
the dynamic equilibrium path of the centrally planned economy, (17a) – (17f).  Two relationships are 
subject to distortions; the consumption-output ratio, (13d’), and the evolution of leisure, (13c’).  In 
principle, the optimal time path can be replicated by the use of two, possibly time-varying, tax rates, 
which in fact can be chosen in several different ways.  This choice proceeds as follows. 
  First, in order for the consumption-output ratio (13d’) to match (17e) we require 













        ( 2 3 )  22 
implying 
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Combining (13c’), (17d), and (24) we see that the optimal path for labor, (17c), can be mimicked by 
setting 0 w τ ≡   -- so that the wage tax remains fixed at the arbitrary constant level,.  ww τ τ =  -- and 
setting the tax on capital  








      ( 2 5 )  
Setting the tax rates in accordance with (23) and (25) with  ww τ τ =  ensures the replication of the 
entire transitional path followed by the first-best equilibrium.   
The optimal tax on capital income corrects the resource distortion resulting from the 
production externality.  The government should subsidize capital investment if there is a positive 
capital externality, and should levy a positive capital income tax if there is a negative capital 
externality.
15  Given the Cobb-Douglas production function being assumed here, this tax is constant 
over time, although it would become time-varying for more general production functions; see Liu 
and Turnovsky (2003).  In contrast, the consumption tax corrects for the distortion caused by the 
consumption externality.  This depends upon 
o q  and is therefore time-varying, as 
o q  evolves in 
accordance with (17d), and can be seen to depend upon the production externality, η .  Although 
both externalities generate distortions in labor supply, no active labor income tax is needed once the 
source of distortions is rectified.  The constant labor income tax can thus be set to zero.  If  0 w τ = , 
private consumption should be subsidized if there is a positive consumption externality and should 
be taxed if there is a negative consumption externality.
16   
Noting (18f), the consumption and labor income tax ratio converges to 
                                                 
15 This result is a familiar one associated with the Romer technology; see e.g. Turnovsky (1996).  In the absence of the 
externality it implies that capital income should be untaxed, a result familiar from early work by Chamley (1986) and 
Judd (1985). 
16 Other tax structures may also attain the first-best optimum.  There are two distortions, one involving consumption, the 
other production, and therefore two tax rates -- one for each distortion -- are required for their correction.   23 
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In the absence of any consumption externality,  0
o q ≡ .  In that case (23) reduces to 
ˆ (1 ) (1 ) 1 cw τ τ +− = , or equivalently  ˆcw τ τ = − , which is constant over time.
17 
  It is interesting to compare this result with the corresponding steady-state optimal tax result 
of Liu and Turnovsky (2003).  Using a general utility function and with the externality being due to 
contemporaneous consumption (i.e.ρ →∞), they obtain 
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Using this notation, (26) can be written as 
















     (27’) 
The difference is due to the fact that in the present model the reference consumption level is a stock 
derived as an exponentially declining average of all past consumptions, whereas in the Liu-
Turnovsky model it depends upon current consumption.  As a result since the consumption reference 
stock is adjusting over-time, we need to take into consideration the rate of time preference. 
Therefore, the marginal utility of the reference stock is weighted by () ρ ρβ + .  Letting ρ →∞ and 
assuming zero growth (27’) coincides with (27).  For the constant elasticity utility function (1), the 
optimal consumption tax, (27), reduces to 1( 1 ) γ − , which is constant over time.   
The same optimal structure is derived if labor supply is inelastic, enabling us to summarize 
our results with the following optimal taxation proposition. 
                                                 
17 Interpreting the tax on wage income as a negative tax on leisure,  ˆ wc τ τ = −  requires that the two utility enhancing 
goods, consumption and leisure, should be taxed uniformly.  This result can be viewed as an intertemporal application of 
the Ramsey principle of optimal taxation; see e.g. Deaton (1981).  If the utility function is multiplicatively separable in 
consumption and leisure, as we are assuming here, then their uniform taxation is optimal. 24 
Proposition 3:  The decentralized economy will exactly replicate the entire time path 
of the optimal (centrally planned) economy if taxes at each instant of time are set in 
accordance with 
























o q t  evolves in accordance with (17d).  In the limiting case ρ →∞, when the 
reference stock is contemporaneous, ( ) ( ) ˆ (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) cw τ τγ +− = − ,  and the 
consumption tax is also constant over time. 
7.   Numerical analysis of some transitional paths. 
To study the transitional dynamics we calibrate the model to reproduce some key features of 
actual economies.
18  Table 1 summarizes the parameters upon which our simulations are based.  
Most of these are standard and non-controversial.  In this regard,  0.65 σ = , implying a labor share of 
income of 65%, the rate of time preference  0.04 β = , the instantaneous intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution, 10 . 4 ε = , population growth rate  0.015 n = , and depreciation rate,  0.05 δ =  are well 
documented, while being a non-scale model, the normalization  1 α =  is unimportant.   
  An important parameter is θ, which describes the degree of substitution between leisure and 
consumption in utility.  The chosen benchmark value θ = 1.75 corresponds to the value chosen in the 
business cycle literature and implies equilibrium fractions of time devoted to leisure of around 0.7, 
consistent with the empirical evidence; see e.g. Cooley (1995).  To illustrate the importance of the 
elasticity of labor supply, we also report some numerical results when labor supply is inelastic.  
The two key parameters upon which we wish to focus pertain to the consumption externality, 
γ , and the production externality, η .  The absence of both externalities  0 γ η == serves as a natural 
benchmark.  For the negative consumption externality, we consider  0.5 γ = , the value taken by 
Carroll et al. (1997) as their benchmark.  For symmetry, we choose  0.5 γ = −  as the magnitude of an 
equivalent positive consumption externality.  We set the speed of adjustment of the reference stock, 
                                                 
18 The dynamics are studied by linearizing the relevant dynamic system, (13) or (17) about its respective steady state, 
(14) and (18).  The details of this are cumbersome, but standard, and are available from the authors on request. 25 
at 0.2 ρ = , also the benchmark value of Carroll et al.
 19  For the production externality, we consider 
the positive externality ( 0.2) η =  [increasing returns] and negative externality ( 0.2) η = −  
[decreasing returns], respectively. 
Table 2a presents the steady-state equilibrium and the corresponding optimal equilibrium for 
the base economy in the case where labor supply is elastic, with  1.75 θ = .  The benchmark 
externality-free economy ( 0) γ η == is indicated in bold face.  As can be seen the decentralized 
economy coincides with the first best optimum.  The chosen parameter values imply an output-
capital ratio of 0.3, consumption output ratio of around 78%, and fraction of time devoted to labor of 
around 32% [68% devoted to leisure].  From Table 2a, the following patterns of responses all which 
are consistent with Proposition 2, can be observed   
1.  In the absence of both the production and the consumption externality the steady 
states of the decentralized and centrally planned economies will coincide; see Panel B, row 2. 
2.  Consumption externality only.  In this case:  
(i)    The steady-state equilibrium of the decentralized economy is unaffected.   
(ii)      If the externality is positive (0 . 5 ) γ = − , then  , , , kLyc      in the centrally planned 
economy are all proportionately larger [relative to the benchmark,  0 γ = ] by 24.9%; if is negative 
(0 . 5 ) γ =  ,,, kLyc     are all proportionately smaller by 32.6%.  The output-capital and consumption-
output ratios are equal in the two economies and are independent of γ , remaining at 0.300 and 
0.783, respectively.  
(iii)    As a result,  , , , kLyc     in the decentralized economy are all 20% below their respective 
optima if  0.5 γ =− , while they are all 48.5% above if 0.5 γ = .   
 3.  Production externality only.   
  (i)      If the externality is positive (0 . 2 ) η = , then  , , , kLyc      in the centrally planned 
                                                 
19These were also the benchmark values considered by Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004).  Because information on both 
, γ ρ  is sparse we have conducted some sensitivity analysis on these parameters.  For example, we have performed some 
simulations using the value  0.8 γ = , estimated by Fuhrer (2000).  We have also chosen larger values of  ρ , as suggested 
by some of the applications of these models to the equity premium puzzle problem, as well as smaller values, which 
yield more plausible speeds of convergence.  Our main qualitative conclusions are robust to the parameter choice. 26 
economy increase although each by differential amounts, relative to the benchmark,  0 η = .  These 
range from a 212% increase in k to just a 10.2% increase in L  , implying a 130% increase in  y  , 
while  c  increases by 98%.  The  yk    and cy   ratios decline by 8 and nearly 11 percentage points 
respectively.  If it is negative,  (0 . 2 ) η = −  ,,, kLyc     decline by 68%, 9.6%, 32%, and 21%, 
respectively, while the  yk    and cy   ratios increase by over 34 and nearly 12 percentage points 
respectively.  The output-capital and consumption-output ratios thus decrease uniformly with η . 
 (ii)      The  decentralized economy responds much more mildly to the production 
externality.  Output and consumption increase by just 13% and 15%, while the capital stock and 
employment decline by 2% and 1%, respectively to a positive externality; in the case of a negative 
externality the corresponding changes are -14%, -14.7%, -5.8%, +0.6%.  The output-capital and 
consumption-output ratios thus increase uniformly with η . 
  (iii)  The output-capital and consumption-output ratios in the decentralized economy exceed 
their optima for  0.2 η = , by 12.7 and 11.8 percentage points.  In that case  , , , kLyc     are all sub-
optimally small, being 68.5%, 10.1%, 50.6% and 42.1%, below their respective optima.  For 
0.2 η =− ,  ,  yk cy     are 36.6 and 12.8 percentage points below their optima implying that  , , , kLyc     
are all 194%, 11.3%, 25.9%, 7.9% too large.  
  4.    Pronounced asymmetries exist with respect to the effects of positive versus negative 
externalities of comparable sizes on the deviations of the decentralized from the centrally planned 
economy.   
  (i)  For the pure consumption externality the deviation is uniformly 48.5% for a positive 
externality but only 20% for a comparable negative externality. 
  (ii)  For the pure production externality the deviations are substantially larger (in 
magnitude) for  0.2 η = , though not necessarily in percentage terms, due to the significant increase in 
size of the centrally planned economy in that case. 
  The reason for these differential responses can be traced to (14e) vs. (18e) and (18f) for the 
consumption externality, and (14c) vs. (18c) for the production externality.  In the former case, the 
key element is the adjustment for the consumption externality,  () 11
o q ϕρ ≡−   , which for 27 
0.5, 0.5 γ =−  implies  0.583,  1.417 ϕ ≡  .  Since the decentralized economy ignores this term, the 
proportionate error being made is larger when  0.5 γ =  than when  0.5 γ = − , thus accounting for the 
greater distortion in that case. 
 Setting  0 γ =  in (18c) we see that the production externality η  impacts positively upon both 
the return to consumption and the productivity of capital.  For the chosen parameterization, the latter 
effect dominates, so that ( yk   ) declines with η  for the central planner.  The decentralized economy 
ignores this effect [see (14c)] and so ( yk   ) increases with η  in that economy.  The asymmetry in 
the responses with respect to  0.2 η =±  follows from the fact that these imply values of 1 σ η − +  
equal to 0.55 vs. 0.15, respectively.  
5.  Distortions arising from positive production externalities are generally reduced in the 
presence of negative consumption externalities and increased in the presence of positive 
consumption externalities.  Distortions with respect to negative production externalities are generally 
increased in the presence of negative consumption externalities, but only slightly in the presence of 
positive consumption externalities. 
  6.  In most cases  , Lk    are either both too large or both too small, relative to the optimum, 
implying the same for output,  y  .  But in some instances -- e.g. a negative consumption externality, 
0.5 γ = , accompanied with a positive production externality,  0.2 η = , -- k  in the decentralized 
economy is too low, while L   is too high, with the former dominating the latter leading to sub-
optimally low output. 
7.  The employment of capital and labor decline (increase) slightly as the consumption 
externality declines (becomes less positive) in the decentralized economy, in the presence of a 
negative (positive) production externality.  They both decline much more rapidly in a centrally 
planned economy, irrespective of the production externality. 
8.  Employment declines gradually in the decentralized economy as the production 
externality increases, the response becoming weaker as the consumption externality increases, in the 
centrally planned economy, the more positive production externality stimulates employment. 28 
  Table 2b provides some comparisons in the case where labor is supplied inelastically, 
yielding some significant differences from Table 2a.
20 
1.  In the absence of the production externality, the decentralized and centrally planned 
economies coincide, irrespective of the consumption externality, consistent with Proposition 1. 
2.  The implications of Proposition 1 regarding productive externalities are supported.  
For 0 η >  capital and output are sub-optimally low, while the  yk  ratio is too high.  
3.  With employment fixed, capital in the decentralized economy increases strongly with 
the production externality, irrespective of the consumption externality. 
4.  The variations in output and consumption arising from both positive and negative 
production externalities are much less sensitive to variations in the consumption externality, than 
when labor is elastically supplied.   
5.  Output and consumption in the centrally planned economy increase with γ  in the 
presence of a positive production externality, in contrast to when labor is elastically supplied.  
8. Increase  in  Productivity 
  Tables 3 and 4 summarize some of the steady-state and short-run effects of a 50% increase in 
productivity, α .   
8.1 Long-run  Effects 
From Table 3 we see that the higher productivity leads to equal long-run increases in output, 
capital stock, and consumption that are independent of the consumption externality γ , and coincide 
in the decentralized and centrally planned economies, consistent with (15).  The table also includes 
measures of welfare loss.  These measure the loss in the representative agent’s optimized utility 
function  Ω [given in (1)], in the two economies (decentralized economy and centrally planned) in 
                                                 
20Note that for the cases  0, 0.2, γ η = =−   0.5, 0.2, γ η = −= −  
* o cc <   even though 
* o kk >  , implying that these are two 
cases of “dynamic inefficiency”. 29 
response to the shocks.  The welfare gains reported are equivalent variation measures, calculated as 
the percentage change in the permanent flow of consumption in the respective economies, necessary 
to equate the levels of welfare to what they would be following the increase in productivity.  Details 
of this calculation are provided in the Appendix. 
In contrast to the various measures of economic activity, the changes in welfare do depend 
upon the consumption externality, γ .  This is because with sluggish adjustment, current 
consumption exceeds the reference level during the transition.  Accordingly, if  0 γ > , the “keeping 
up with the Joneses” individual derives additional utility, relative to a conventional individual having 
time separable utility, due to the fact that he is doing better than his peers.  For example, if 
0 γ η ==, the individual’s intertemporal welfare increases by 69.7%, whereas if  0 γ > , the gain in 
welfare is increased to 82.4%.  An altruistic individual, however, has only a 64.2% welfare gain.   
Several related features stand out in Table 3.  First, the percentage utility gains are similar in 
magnitude for the decentralized and centrally planned economies with identical externalities, though 
generally somewhat larger for the latter.  But since the decentralized economy usually has a non-
optimal production and consumption structure, its initial welfare level is substantially below that of 
the centrally planned economy, so that the absolute utility gains are significantly smaller.  Second, in 
some cases, utility gains are proportionately larger in the decentralized economy, though its welfare 
remains well below the optimum.  Thus, if  0.5,  0.2 γ η = = , welfare increases by 120% in the 
decentralized economy and only by 116% in the centrally planned economy.  This represents a 
situation where the welfare of the decentralized economy improves from 69.2% of the optimal 
economy in terms of consumption flow to 70.4%.  Third, the differences between economies in 
which labor supply is elastic and inelastic, respectively, are small.  This is because the accumulated 
changes in consumption between the various structures are identical while even when labor is 
supplied elastically there is no change in long-run employment.  Intertemporal utility differences 
therefore reflect only timing changes along the transitional paths and these are presumably small.   
It is also of interest to compare these long-run responses to those obtained in the more 
familiar case of “keeping up with the Joneses” where the consumption externality enters utility 
contemporaneously.  Since the long-run responses are independent of ρ , the long-run changes in 30 
capital, output, and other variables are unchanged from those in Table 3.  However, the utility gains 
are different.  In general, we find that the utility gains for the time non-separable utility function 
exceed (are less than) those for conventional utility according to whether the consumption 
externality, is negative, (positive).  If  0 γ > , for example, the agent derives additional utility from 
having current consumption exceed the economy-wide reference level, with this extra utility gain 
being enhanced with the gradual adjustment of the reference level in the present case.   
8.2   Short-Run Effects 
  Tables 4a and 4b report the short-run responses to the productivity increase.  We shall focus 
on the interaction between the negative consumption externality ( 0.5) γ =  and the positive 
production externality ( 0.2) η =  summarized by Rows 2 and 3 in Panels B and C.   
Consider first the benchmark case where there are no externalities,  0 γ η ==.  In this case, 
the decentralized economy exactly mimics the centrally planned economy throughout the entire 
transitional path.  A productivity increase of 50% immediately raises employment in both economies 
by 0.95 percentage points, raising output by 52.9% and consumption by 46.4%.  The change in 
instantaneous welfare, expressed in terms of an equivalent variation in consumption is defined in the 
Appendix.  With  0 γ = , the increase in consumption raises this by 46.4%, but this is offset by the 
higher employment (decline in leisure) so that the short-run rise in welfare is only 42.8%. 
Negative consumption externality: Now suppose that there is a negative consumption 
externality ( 0.5 γ = ) but no production externality ( 0 η = ) [see Panel C, row 2].  In this case, the 
decentralized economy starts out from an initial steady state in which consumption, capital, output, 
and employment are all 48.3% higher than in the corresponding centrally planned economy.  The 
50% increase in α  raises output directly in both economies, and will raise consumption, though by a 
lesser amount, due an increase in the savings ratio.  As a result, the consumption-output ratio falls 
initially in both economies.  Since the representative agent in the decentralized economy ignores the 
negative consumption externality, he overvalues consumption, relative to its optimum, so that 
consumption increases more in the decentralized economy, causing the consumption-output ratio to 
decline by less in that economy.  At the same time, by impacting directing on final output, the 31 
productivity shock increases the ultimate scarcity of habit relative to capital, thereby making q more 
negative, so that the social value of the consumption-output ratio, () ( 1 ) cy q ρ −  actually declines 
less.  As a result, leisure in the centrally planned economy declines less [c.f. (13d) and (17e)] so that 
labor supply increases more in the decentralized economy, raising output by more in that economy, 
as well.  The effect of these non-optimal adjustments is that welfare increases in the decentralized 
economy by 71.5%, rather than 77.6%, in the optimal economy. 
  Following their initial jumps, output, and consumption in both the decentralized and centrally 
planned economies increase monotonically toward their new steady states levels, while the capital 
stocks increase gradually from their respective initial levels.  Since in the long-run labor allocations 
do not change, labor supply declines monotonically in both economies, back toward their respective 
original steady-state values.   
Since our concern is to focus on the relative deviations of the decentralized economy from 
the optimum, Fig. 1.A plots the time paths of the ratios 
**** , , , 
oo oo yy cc kk L L .  Fig 1.A(i) 
illustrates the present case  0.5, 0 γ η == .  All four variables start out at the common ratio 1.483 and 
eventually converge back to that ratio after the shock.  On impact, 
* o cc  rises to around 1.51, 
* o LL  
to 1.495, 
* o yy  to 1.490, while the capital stock remains fixed instantaneously.  The amount of 
over-consumption, over-production, and over-employment in the decentralized economy all 
increase.  The over-consumption in the decentralized economy means that capital begins to 
accumulate at a slower rate in the decentralized economy, so that 
* o kk  initially declines, although 
eventually it is restored back to its equilibrium.  The interesting feature of these paths is that 
throughout the transition all four variables exceed their respective optima, with some deviations in 
the degree during the early stages.  These divergences in the paths reflect the fact that agents in the 
decentralized economy, by ignoring the impact of current consumption on the reference level 
generate a faster speed of convergence; see Alvarez-Cuadrado, et. al. (2004). 
Positive production externality: Now suppose that there is a positive production externality 
(0 . 2 η = ) but no consumption externality ( 0 γ = ) [see Panel B, row 3].  In this case the decentralized 
economy is one in which capital, labor, output, and consumption are all less than their respective 
optima, but to vastly different degrees (
** * * 31%, 90% , 49%,  58%
oo o o kk LL yy cc == = =    ).  32 
Since the productivity shock affects all variables proportionately, and since the positive production 
externality has little effect on the relative speeds of convergence of the two economies, Fig. 1.A (ii) 
illustrates how the deviations from the optimum remain almost constant along the transitional paths. 
Positive production externality and negative consumption externality:  We now combine 
cases (i) and (ii) by assuming  0.2,  0.5 η γ ==  [see Panel C, row 3].  This combines elements of the 
two previous cases.  Whereas the capital stock, output, and consumption are all initially less than 
their respective optima (
** * 53%, 83%,  99%
oo o kk yy cc == =   ), labor exceeds its optimum 
(
* 129%
o LL=  ).  On the one hand the negative consumption externality leads to over-employment, 
over-production, and over-consumption, on the other, the production externality has the opposite 
effect.  As in Fig. 1.A(ii), there is almost no change in the deviation of the decentralized economy 
relative to its optimum over time.  The most interesting feature about Fig. 1.A(iii) is that the effect of 
the negative consumption externality is to cause initial over-consumption by about 2%, which 
gradually declines over time and after about 20 years returns to under-consumption.  
Table 4b provides the analogous effects in the case where labor supply is perfectly inelastic, 
with Fig. 1.B illustrating the dynamic adjustments.  The same generally qualitative responses can be 
seen, although there are some differences.  With labor inelastic and capital fixed instantaneously the 
50% increases in productivity immediately translates to a 50% increase in output, irrespective of 
other structural parameters.
21  The dynamic adjustments have generally the same qualitative 
properties as when labor supply is elastic, except that they are shifted up by the production 
externality and down by the consumption externality.  The most interesting aspect is the negative 
consumption externality in Fig 1.B(i).  With inelastic labor supply the consumption externality has 
no long-run distortionary effects, so that all three ratios, 
** * , , 
oo o yy cc kk , illustrated in that 
figure, begin and converge to unity, consistent with Proposition 1.  During the transition they 
diverge, and in fact during the first few years of the transition there is over-consumption in the 
decentralized economy, after which there is under-consumption. 
                                                 
21Our results for the transitional path provide an interesting contrast from the result obtained by Liu and Turnovsky 
(2003) based on the conventional time separable utility function.  For the constant elasticity specification being assumed 
here they find that the consumption externality causes no distortionary effects along the transitional path.  That is not the 
case here, although it does obtain in the limiting case ρ →∞, when the two utility specifications converge. 33 
8.3 Optimal  Taxation 
  We briefly characterize the optimal tax policy in response to this shock.  First, the optimal 
tax on capital is constant, given by (25).  For the chosen parameter values  ˆ 57.1%, 0,  57.1% k τ =− , 
corresponding to  0.20, 0, 0.20 η =− , respectively.  This is identical to the optimal capital tax in the 
Romer model, requiring that capital income should be taxed or subsidized depending upon whether 
the externality if negative or positive.  The only point worth adding is that the tax depends only upon 
the technology and is independent of the specific structural change, in this case a 50% increase in α . 
  Fig. 2 plots the optimal consumption/wage tax ratio,  ˆ (1 ) (1 )
c
w τ τ +− , as it tracks the time 
path of  ( )
o qt  generated by the productivity shock.  The case of a positive consumption externality is 
illustrated in the upper figure.  The optimal ratio  ˆ (1 ) (1 )
c
w τ τ +−  begins at its steady-state value 
1.714 [see (26’)].  Following the jump in the shadow value 
o q  generated by the productivity increase 
and it jumps to 1.778, after which it converges back toward 1.714, as consumption habits adjust and 
o q  declines in magnitude.  In the case of a negative externality, the ratio begins at 0.706, drops down 
to 0.69, then gradually rises after the shock, reaching 0.712 after around 10 years before declining 
slightly back toward its steady-state equilibrium value 0.706.  In contrast to the tax on capital, the 
optimal consumption/wage tax ratio depends upon the specific shock to the economy. 
8.4 Slower  convergence 
  The dynamic adjustments illustrated in Fig. 1 show relatively little variation in the deviations 
of the decentralized economy from the optimum over time.  For the pure consumption externality the 
maximum deviations during the initial phase are of the order of 1.5% if labor supply is elastic and 
less if  0 θ = .  While the deviations are sustained in the presence of a production externality, they are 
very uniform over time. 
  One characteristic of our chosen parameterization is that it implies an asymptotic speed of 
convergence of around 10%.  While this is consistent with some estimates [e.g. Caselli et al. (1996)] 
it is generally above the consensus values, which now range up to about 6%.
22  Calibration of this 
                                                 
22Early studies by Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) established a benchmark convergence rate of 2-3%.  
Subsequent research suggest that the convergence rates are more variable and sensitive to time periods and the set of 34 
aspect of the model can be improved by increasing the consumption externality γ  to 0.9 [closer to 
the value of 0.8 estimated by Fuhrer (2000)], while slowing its adjustment to  0.1 ρ = .  Figure 3A 
plots the deviations of the decentralized economy from the optimum in response to a 50% 
productivity increase in the absence of any production externality and inelastic labor supply.  The 
capital stock in particular shows an interesting time path, although this is mirrored in the other 
variables.  During the first few years there is over-accumulation of capital by about 0.5%, during the 
next 85 years there is under-accumulation of capital, which reaches 5% below its optimum after 
around 40 years, and finally after about 95 years there is over-accumulation of capital.  The main 
point is that with slower convergence, the deviations become substantial in magnitude.   
Fig. 3B plots the time path for the optimal consumption/wage income tax ratio.  It too shows 
relatively larger variations and non-monotonic behavior, reflecting the more complex dynamics of 
the underlying economy as the speed of convergence declines, and in particular  ( )
o qt . 
9. Conclusions 
The theoretical and empirical importance of both consumption and production externalities 
are well documented.  In addition, a growing body of empirical evidence supports the importance of 
time non-separable preferences as an alternative to the conventional time separable utility function.  
With this motivation, this paper has examined the effects of both types of externalities on economic 
performance assuming this more general specification of preferences and discussed the appropriate 
corrective taxes.  In the light of previous research emphasizing the importance of the interaction 
between preferences and technology, our analysis has employed the more flexible non-scale 
production technology.  The approach we have taken is to combine the theoretical analysis with 
numerical simulations based on the calibration of a plausible macroeconomic growth model. 
We have drawn three main sets of theoretical conclusions.  First, a consumption externality 
in isolation has long-run distortionary effects if and only if labor is supplied elastically.  This is 
because it impinges on the long-run equilibrium through the consumption-leisure tradeoff in utility, 
                                                                                                                                                                   
countries than originally suggested, and a wider range of estimates have been obtained.  For example, Islam (1995) 
estimates the rate of convergence to be 4.7% for non-oil countries and 9.7% for OECD economies.  Evans (1997) obtains 
estimates of the convergence rate of around 6% per annum.  Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) provide a detailed analysis 
of convergence speeds for the time non-separable utility function.  35 
together with the interaction between labor and capital in production.  The elasticity of labor supply 
thus becomes an important determinant of the empirical significance of consumption externalities.  
Although with fixed labor supply, consumption externalities alone have no long-run effects, they 
still have transitional distortionary effects and they will generate long-run distortions through their 
interaction with production externalities.  With elastic labor supply, a negative consumption 
externality leads to sub-optimally large long-run capital, labor supply, output, and consumption.   
Second, production externalities always generate long-run distortions, irrespective of whether 
or not labor supply is fixed.  Thus a positive production externality leads to a sub-optimally low 
capital stock with under-production and under-consumption.  In addition, a consumption externality 
will affect the potency of the production externality on long-run activity through its impact on the 
labor-leisure choice and thus on the marginal product of capital. 
Third, we have provided a simple characterization of optimal tax policy that enables the 
replication of the entire optimal path.  It requires that capital income be taxed or subsidized at a 
constant rate that corrects for the production externality, while consumption should be taxed or 
subsidized at a time-varying rate that corrects for the divergence between the social and private 
benefits from the consumption externality.   
The simulations supplement these theoretical findings with important quantitative insights.  
Perhaps the most striking finding is the sharp contrast between the effects of the consumption and 
production externalities on the deviations of the decentralized economy from the optimum along the 
transitional paths.  Finally, at several points we have compared our results with those obtained under 
conventional time-separable preferences.  While we have found some similarities, particularly across 
steady states, there are also important differences, both qualitative and quantitative, particularly 
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 Table 2a: Impact of Externalities on Equilibrium: Elastic labor supply ( 1.75 θ = ) 
 
A. Positive consumption externality (γ =− 0.5) 
 
 
 Decentralized  Economy  Optimum 
η  k L y c  y/k  c/y  k L y c  y/k  c/y 
-0.2  2.00  0.325 0.535 0.411 0.267 0.770 0.816 0.371 0.509 0.459 0.624 0.901 
0  2.05  0.322 0.615 0.482 0.300 0.783  2.56  0.402 0.768 0.602 0.300 0.783 
0.2  1.82  0.317 0.657 0.527 0.362 0.802  7.70  0.430 1.774 1.222 0.230 0.689 
 
 
B. Zero consumption externality (γ = 0)  
 
 Decentralized  Economy  Optimum 
η  k L y c  y/k  c/y  k L y c  y/k  c/y 
-0.2  1.93  0.324 0.530 0.411 0.275 0.776 0.657 0.291 0.421 0.381 0.641 0.904 
0  2.05  0.322 0.615 0.482 0.300 0.783  2.05  0.322 0.615 0.482 0.300 0.783 
0.2  2.01  0.319 0.698 0.554 0.348 0.794  6.39  0.355 1.414 0.956 0.221 0.676 
 
 
C. Negative consumption externality (γ = 0.5) 
 
 Decentralized  Economy  Optimum 
η  k L y c  y/k  c/y  k L y c  y/k  c/y 
-0.2  1.86  0.322 0.525 0.411 0.282 0.782 0.462 0.192 0.305 0.276 0.659 0.907 
0  2.05  0.322 0.615 0.482 0.300 0.783  1.38  0.217 0.414 0.325 0.300 0.783 
0.2  2.23  0.321 0.742 0.583 0.333 0.785  4.20  0.248 0.890 0.590 0.212 0.662 
 
 
 Table 2b: Impact of Externalities on Equilibrium: Inelastic labor supply( 0 θ = ) 
 
A. Positive consumption externality (γ =− 0.5) 
 
 
 Decentralized  Economy  Optimum 
η  k y c  y/k  c/y  k y c  y/k  c/y 
-0.2  4.72  1.26  0.972 0.267 0.770  1.74  1.09  0.980 0.624 0.901 
0  6.37 1.91 1.50  0.300  0.783  6.37 1.91 1.50  0.300  0.783 
0.2  9.57 3.46 2.78  0.362  0.802  26.1 6.02 4.14  0.230  0.689 
 
B. Zero consumption externality (γ = 0)  
 
 Decentralized  Economy  Optimum 
η  k y c  y/k  c/y  k y c  y/k  c/y 
-0.2  4.57  1.26  0.975 0.275 0.776  1.69  1.08  0.978 0.642 0.904 
0  6.37 1.91 1.50  0.300  0.783  6.37 1.91 1.50  0.300  0.783 





C. Negative consumption externality (γ = 0.5) 
 
 
 Decentralized  Economy  Optimum 
η  k y c  y/k  c/y  k y c  y/k  c/y 
-0.2  4.43  1.25  0.978 0.282 0.782  1.63  1.08  0.976 0.659 0.907 
0  6.37 1.91 1.50  0.300  0.783  6.37 1.91 1.50  0.300  0.783 
0.2 11.49  3.83 3.01  0.333  0.785  31.4 6.65 4.41  0.212  0.662 
 
 Table 3: 50% increase in Productivity α  Steady-state 
 
A.  Elastic labor supply ( 1.75 θ = ) 
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B.  Inelastic labor supply ( 0 θ = ) 
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61.1 
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146.2 
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  Table 4a Short-run Effect of 50% Increase in α : Elastic labor supply ( 1.75 θ = ) 
 
A. Positive consumption externality (γ =− 0.5) 
 
 



























-0.2 -0.04  0.267  0.206  49.9 50.2 31.3 0.15  0.257  0.247  50.4 53.8 32.8 
0  -0.71  0.295  0.254  47.9 52.7 34.2 -0.33  0.378  0.333  49.2 55.3 35.0 
0.2 -0.87  0.311  0.281  47.3 53.4 35.0 -0.86  0.851  0.695  48.0 56.9 37.4 
 
 
B. Zero consumption externality (γ = 0)  
 



























-0.2 1.82  0.294  0.178  55.4 43.2 36.5 1.04  0.225  0.175  53.5 46.0 42.2 
0  0.95  0.325  0.224  52.9 46.4 42.8 0.95  0.325  0.224  52.9 46.4 42.8 
0.2  0.29  0.355  0.271  50.9 48.9 47.7 0.49  0.725  0.460  51.3 48.1 46.2 
 
 
C. Negative consumption externality (γ = 0.5) 
 



























-0.2 3.56  0.318  0.152  60.6 37.0 55.3 0.87  0.166  0.104  54.4 37.5 82.0 
0  2.62  0.355  0.194  57.8 40.3 71.5 1.60  0.236  0.124  57.1 38.2 77.6 
0.2  1.61  0.407  0.257  54.8 44.0 90.5 1.69  0.504  0.237  56.6 40.1 81.3 
 
 
 Table 4b Short-run Effect of 50% Increase in α : Inelastic labor supply ( 0 θ = ) 
 
A. Positive consumption externality (γ =− 0.5) 
 
 























-0.2 0.630  0.486  50.0 50.0 31.1  0.545  0.522  50.0 53.3 32.6 
0  0.955  0.816  50.0 54.4 33.6  0.955  0.843  50.0 56.2 34.6 
0.2 1.730  1.551  50.0 55.8 34.4  3.010  2.457  50.0 59.3 36.4 
 
 
B. Zero consumption externality (γ = 0)  
 























-0.2 0.630  0.378  50.0 38.8 38.8  0.540  0.391  50.0 43.2 43.2 
0  0.955  0.660  50.0 44.0 44.0  0.955  0.660  50.0 44.0 44.0 
0.2 1.820  1.390  50.0 48.1 48.0  3.160  2.003  50.0 46.9 46.9 
 
C. Negative consumption externality (γ = 0.5) 
 























-0.2 0.625  0.282  50.0 28.8 66.0  0.540  0.348  50.0 35.7 84.0 
0  0.955  0.515  50.0 34.3 80.4  0.955  0.513  50.0 34.2 80.1 
0.2 1.505  1.207  50.0 40.1 96.3  3.325  1.588  50.0 36.0 85.0 
 
 
 Figure 1: Increase in Productivity α  
  
 
A.  Elastic labor supply ( 1.75 θ = )      B.    Inelastic labor supply ( 0 θ = )  










































(ii) (0 . 2 ,0 ) η γ = =  
 
 










      











(iii) ( 0.2, 0.5) η γ = =  
 
 
Capital   Labor  Output   Consumption 
 Figure 2 
Optimal Consumption/Wage Tax (1 . 7 5 ) θ =  
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( ) 0, 0.5 ηγ == − Figure 3:   
 
A. Slower  convergence 
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B.  Optimal consumption/wage income tax 
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 A.1 
Appendix 
A.1  Derivation of Equilibrium System (13) 
Using the first order condition (8a) and (8b), together with (10) we can eliminate λ  and 
obtain the marginal rate of substitution condition, (13d).  Taking the time derivative of the optimality 
condition (8a), the aggregate production function (9), the definitions of  i C  and i K , and the marginal 
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         ( A . 5 )  
From these five equations, together with (8c), (3) (10), and (7) we are able to eliminate 
,  ,  ,  ,  and  ii i i CCC CY Y KK HH λλ    reducing these equations to a unique equation in l, 
(13c).  Differentiating   and  kh  and using (7’) and (3) we obtain (13a) and (13b). 
A.2  Elimination of Non-Optimal Output-Capital Equilibrium ratio 
We show how there are potentially two steady-state solutions for the output-capital ratio in 
the centrally planned economy, although one is shown to violate the transversality condition and can 
thus be eliminated.  We first note that setting  0
oo lq = =   , the steady-state solutions for (17c) and 
(17d) reduce to: A.2 
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provided (1 ) 0
o q ρ −≠  .  Substituting (18a) and (18b) into (A.6a), this equation reduces to (18c) of 
the text, namely   
()() () []
1
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     (A.7a)) 
Combining this with (A.6b) and (18b) can then be shown to yield (18f) of the text.  Alternatively, if 
(1 ) 0













         ( A . 7 b )  
We now consider the transversality condition (16e), and note that it is equivalent to 
     1 ˆ ˆ 0 i K λβ +− <       ( A . 8 )  










λβ δ σ η
λ

≡=+ + − − + 


                                           (A.9a) 
  ˆ (1 ) i Kgn =−         ( A . 9 b )  
Substituting (A.9a), (A9b) and (A.7b) into (A8) we find 1 ˆ ˆ (1 ) i Kg n λβ ρ +− = +−, which violates the 
(16e) under any plausible conditions.  We can therefore we can eliminate solution (A.7b).   
Substituting (A.7a)  1 ˆ ˆ (1 ) ( 1) ( 1) i Kg n λ βε γ β +− =− − − − , which satisfies (16e) in general. A.3 
A.3.  Welfare Changes as Measured by Equivalent Variations in Income Flows 
  We assume that the economy is initially on a balanced growth path, (indexed by b) which is 
growing at the equilibrium growth rate, gn.  Recalling the definitions of the scale-adjusted variables, 
the corresponding level of base welfare is given by  
  ()
() ()
(1 )(1 ) 1 1( 1 )
1 0 [(1 )( 1)(1 ) ]
,, , 0 0
1
11
bb b tg n t
ibib ib
cl h N
ClH e d t e d t
γε θε εγ ε
ε θγ β ε γ β
εε
−− − −− −
∞ ∞ − −− − − − − =
−− ∫∫  (A.7) 
where , , bb b clh  are the constant ratios along the initial balanced growth path, and  0 N  serves as a 
convenient scale for the initial levels of income and consumption.  Evaluating (A.7) yields the base 
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  Intertemporal welfare along an equilibrium path is given by  
()
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
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where , , aa a clh  denote the time-varying trajectories along the resulting transitional path. 
  As a means of comparing these two levels of utility, we determine the percentage change in 
the initial consumption level,  0 N , and therefore in the consumption flow over the entire base path, 
such that the agent is indifferent between  , , bb b clh  and  , , aa a clh .  That is, we seek to find ζ  such that  
    00 (,,; ) (,,; ) bb b aa a a Wc l h N Wc l h N W ζ = =      ( A . 1 0 )  
Performing this calculation yields 
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and hence       A.4 
    ()
1( 1 ) ( 1 ) 11 ab WW
εγ ζ
−− −= −       ( A . 1 1 )  
(A.11) determines the change in the base consumption (income) level, and thus in the consumption 
level at all points of time that will enable the agent’s base level of intertemporal welfare to equal that 
following some structural change. 
  The relative welfare gain at any instant of time t along the transitional path (over the base 
level at the corresponding time) is calculated analogously, by 
    ()
1( 1 ) ( 1 ) 11 ab ZZ
εγ ξ
−− −= −       ( A . 1 2 )  
where  () ( )
11
() , () ()() () bb b b a Zt c l h Zt c t l th t
ε ε θγ θ γ −− −− ≡≡, so that  
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The change in instantaneous utility, (A.13), can also be written as 
    ()
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() () () ()
11
() () () () bb b b
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which brings out the fact that as long as  0 γ ≠ , welfare differentials depend upon absolute as well as 
relative consumption (in addition to leisure). 
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